Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 326ccce7c4186526…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.0 KB
MD5: bd52ea5e27b88429e718105afaa8fa97 SHA-1: 656cbc12f64df997ff77d008ad130e8abaee571e SHA-256: 326ccce7c418652680f38f8121657eb4f72a12667b1b56e6c999e2bf6ee45564
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that exploits the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics strongly indicates this exploit. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic suggests that the OLE object is automatically activated upon opening the document, leading to arbitrary code execution. The specific class `EQUatioN.3` is identified as part of the exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b2.bin
4129db1354dc281b6b11d3d1e6c6e7c2768c95a5d9bd171c83c8f9f7648c37a9		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB2 1777 bytes

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