Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 32624f16db54a9a0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

622.3 KB
MD5: addb9ec38e1f28f8e3e36a0ac9975d06 SHA-1: 9ba678d6ca8452c9abc7eb2450410dee8678bc15 SHA-256: 32624f16db54a9a0594f74a739d61f2b5d637218a05700d9c9c5df21fa638ad5
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains an altChunk that imports an RTF file, which in turn contains embedded OLE objects. The RTF object is configured to automatically update and execute, indicating an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities or run embedded code. The presence of RTF injection and OLE object activation strongly suggests a downloader or dropper mechanism designed to fetch and execute further malicious content.

Heuristics 6

  • altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF
    Document inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    (in altChunk RTF word/Montenegro.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/Montenegro.rtf) RTF contains ~2817KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    (in altChunk RTF word/Montenegro.rtf) RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    (in altChunk RTF word/Montenegro.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://opendope.org/xpaths
    • http://opendope.org/conditions
    • http://opendope.org/questions
    • http://opendope.org/components
    • http://opendope.org/SmartArt/DataHierarchy
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/schemaLibrary/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chart
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chartDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/spreadsheetDrawing
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2008/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/compatibility
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/lockedCanvas

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003a12.bin
57211e3efa8c8805509101da38c186b94150d62ff85b989caa8d86e3adf6abb0		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12 1420905 bytes
objdata_01_off002c4737.bin
cfdb4a077c5f246e92e6322395cebc5a3dcf8a28c92ec8882aadb5231c9a8a69		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2C4737 584266 bytes

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