Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3256d6bf048e0e2f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

180.5 KB Created: 2023-07-01 09:31:47 +00:00 Authoring application: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/114.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 (via Skia/PDF m114) First seen: 2026-06-07
MD5: 94624a1db70e6908b7984f3a119712ed SHA-1: f12c3d67555daf185360615241468d9620755e0a SHA-256: 3256d6bf048e0e2fe4aa29bef9ef5285da38076ac28af7ecf483642262ee2313
104 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier clean score 0.1236

Heuristics 4

  • Invisible/repeated PDF links deliver payload file critical PDF_REPEATED_PAYLOAD_LINK_LURE
    PDF uses invisible link annotations and points to a direct payload download. Repeated invisible links or lure-like payload names such as document/unlock/verify archives match malware-delivery PDF carriers where the page is only a prompt and the real payload is fetched from the linked URL.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://transfer.sh/get/R3w7V1oURr/ShipmentDocument.exe In PDF document text
    • https://poppinsbooks.co.nz/wp-includes/pl9b0397/NewPurchaseOrderPO2455.zipIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0002bf56.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2BF56 3396 bytes
SHA-256: db734aa2e1070ddc0482544a32fec3220bcab91c410152a4df52ef1cf70ff743