Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 321c9e22bbe615bd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.4 KB Created: 2021-06-02 21:40:57 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 8a7bdc79634caf6b611968f2c66b64b2 SHA-1: 5102a154e3719dcbf472adf4c781e9aefa698dac SHA-256: 321c9e22bbe615bd56de2078184bfecb4620d309106e31acd3b7f69d5246c4f7
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a phishing or malicious link farm attempt. It contains numerous external links, many hosted on disposable domains, designed to redirect users to potentially harmful content. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, appears to contain metadata related to its creation, but no direct scripting or executable content was found within the provided evidence.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9991

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://queure.ru/pbw?utm_term=mashed+potatoes+with+sour+cream+or+cream+cheese
    • https://velawavasikene.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/4/135400921/5752084.pdf
    • https://siketaxugulus.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135309361/vusoxeruni.pdf
    • https://ruwivogisi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134265822/badoxo_pijuposibow.pdf
    • https://sexutenevasasi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134306733/87c979a428.pdf
    • https://fewabobur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134713859/d45425249228d7.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4392853/normal_5ffb44f699a89.pdf
    • https://vazozedirasamib.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134013018/pavifal-mafopezerif-joronorixofe-xonewapapa.pdf
    • https://fobinoxibenor.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437242/2302f568105b4.pdf
    • https://zasawebisev.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134865024/sejovelu_kuwamaf.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4472783/normal_6002a6d16cd7c.pdf
    • https://kanazotevixif.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740718/bisaninanavedot_gatekifut_jopojowuxum.pdf
    • https://xunujilitaga.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135315779/lazunup-votufik-fokafekov-zadatuwitowo.pdf
    • https://bezesigut.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681157/detumof.pdf
    • https://gejizataki.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133997606/5582aa48.pdf
    • https://tofuxatedev.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134706151/d1231f.pdf
    • https://dibagipowuxuz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776183/fopujuk.pdf
    • https://laxonetamaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134096763/sixudefe-zopexomuw-mitivu.pdf
    • https://falevuwutote.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135301590/bedomotuxunetopugew.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4454678/normal_6054038369a83.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4447434/normal_5fe2767f86b46.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d8acb91a-923b-47e7-b587-93f44875c00d/vabovotagotadope.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/dbd012cc-a5f8-4ff6-ae69-283b399fe0ee/how_do_i_sync_my_rogers_ignite_remote_to_my_tv.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e33c.bin
344a4c0252f8a4be53323f008fd9f015e92c979639748050862b60efa7a3909e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE33C 5152 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f4d9.bin
3bd38a87667436cd31a61d55e95f82ac1c56b21d898d36d201ce5fa46e4d570a
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF4D9 10736 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000119c7.bin
532315dfdc59b350d447ad91845dd8cc72a836e684f536ab9a4305dc5b53fb8e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x119C7 16204 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off00012ef7.bin
05d2457133b820fa77aa358e30e9acfbad3f04c46ced9a37296d9311117db176
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12EF7 4324 bytes