Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 320af05932be1b55…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.4 KB
MD5: 96e849a950cad60a965453f0f1d29811 SHA-1: 5fe3856d63badc964407766f859088dc558c85e1 SHA-256: 320af05932be1b554ce3fd80e0593825246838d98598593b9ac1f546607a64f4
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, which is a common technique for exploiting this vulnerability. This exploit likely leads to the execution of a second-stage payload, although no specific payload or download URL was extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000044.bin
9d4bfc438c0078949962b93957ea5d8bc81667dc8aa58151ca149e6dbff1fbe0
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x44 2093 bytes