Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 320798f2949568e3…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

67.6 KB
MD5: 5dc056f6b4669a0c2e793aef3184344c SHA-1: b24b381bea3337c54ac98b68d7cfde99eeb93147 SHA-256: 320798f2949568e32a15319cfaac77ef26febbb0ae7364f15e2bc45c37053e29
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor vulnerabilities. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" sections indicates an attempt to automatically activate and execute embedded content, likely leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting known vulnerabilities in older Microsoft Office components.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000016ba.bin
e2ee6d2616cc30716e49c5015a731c0c5041800605da81df77dc969c988772f8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x16BA 1729 bytes