Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 31e1332e636d05f5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

94.3 KB Created: 2008-04-23 12:48:44 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: cf07828a89bf498e74b820a721e6e9d4 SHA-1: c562d2cce2a8505bbf247df663cc5918ce438022 SHA-256: 31e1332e636d05f5d108e06ee0f3255378586bec8290fc563dffffd0770fc890
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OLE document with a significant slack space anomaly, indicating potential obfuscation or embedded content. Crucially, it contains an embedded PE executable. Heuristics also indicate references to LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress APIs, common in malware for loading dynamic libraries. The embedded executable is the primary indicator of malicious intent, suggesting the document serves as a dropper for a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESS
    PEB access via FS segment (x86)
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 96,521 bytes but its declared streams total only 40,506 bytes — 56,015 bytes (58%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0H
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA2.crl0O
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CodeSignPCA2.crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/sysinternals

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_0000bc00.exe
2761900a79e6be146f1ff58618107d2caa15b3574237adf125f9b876af1a1057		 embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0xBC00 48393 bytes

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