Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 31b858ad68cd17f5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

52.8 KB Created: 2020-11-09 06:18:31 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: 08f0c819dc7cdfd6efb0b7ba90c68c4b SHA-1: 5f7e6ed9e20717d9073d5aac74670c115cda837c SHA-256: 31b858ad68cd17f5b1d07869445eb33f709a5fc509d3ce3bdaef905509b52098
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document contains numerous embedded links, with several pointing to known malicious redirectors and link farms. The primary function appears to be directing users to external, potentially malicious websites, possibly for SEO manipulation or phishing. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs strongly suggest malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/123?keyword=campus+life+at+ucf In PDF document text
    • https://panofokolonap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134483377/aa3369e2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pazijovipa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134327002/625325.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lirebuzufosol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453665/1938625.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mesovozilepako.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134588792/77e0987c844fe86.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vuxutuwatojo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134625262/3aad950f938b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gexumuvebevo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134312536/sanupu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://megadezatesaram.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776649/nojilu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://donikigegetala.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134311768/pokuroberurujarunu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sazariwapa/las_crceles_de_la_miseria_loc_wacquant.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sabegokek/zopusasepule.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sebuwisawos.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/fipupojuretis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gateme/kewudawukuzuvikajaziraxof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rebozowenopo.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/xibosud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007195.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7195 8312 bytes
SHA-256: a927359e024f4706d121e7f7e1a050d12c704454efb547cac0a396fc6e312bbe
font_01_sfnt_off00008d76.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8D76 4972 bytes
SHA-256: 53f5bb5641985af4ffdda5ab7f866f40ffd1c6028e595584b931fc17b5a90e67
font_02_sfnt_off00009e4f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9E4F 11516 bytes
SHA-256: 08931e9dcf59c15f65db7ceb6d9a517b5821d28c09b0e8678b5b74b2c233b9d2

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.