Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 31a6513bf5d8f4d0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.9 KB Created: 2020-10-04 14:41:27 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: f24fa2f3a419a751b7b6e3b9c7cf135a SHA-1: 7e074c02bbafab574d88cd69b815d476c3cd7017 SHA-256: 31a6513bf5d8f4d083c3d3cbb94b4f52d4f6a398aca09850a555f7cf23cbb08d
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF document functions as a link farm, directing users to multiple external websites, including a known malicious redirector. The embedded content suggests a lure related to 'Cpm ebooks answers integrated 2' to entice clicks. The primary goal appears to be driving traffic to potentially malicious or scam-related sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/pify?keyword=cpm+ebooks+answers+integrated+2 In PDF document text
    • https://site-1037054.mozfiles.com/files/1037054/27729969397.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037203.mozfiles.com/files/1037203/vesob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1041411.mozfiles.com/files/1041411/bopuguro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.desirapesta.us/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164574/8323988.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.the-trilinq-sg.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131436956/topesevavofeke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.weekly-eats.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379035/kenajezam-vivupufi-ritimifox-mawemokupe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fevumubiv.jrconstruction.net/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607254/vowomixubivo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ginabi.optimisticliving.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969862/gupojenulusi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rupuf.liberationschoolsouth.org/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710634/lisexidibutojepuluk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kezoma.cpmbl.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856022/b31d91a2a662.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039608.mozfiles.com/files/1039608/86691282085.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037893.mozfiles.com/files/1037893/bivofenem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007c0c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7C0C 5484 bytes
SHA-256: 41cf3b88b849afd298997d03ce4f22175dfd283db59220e7b51bc7696b3cf698
font_01_sfnt_off00008ea5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8EA5 10748 bytes
SHA-256: af36c514d0773697ea231d5bf746bc1acb2725270ef1871a9f0ec83a02890026
font_02_sfnt_off0000b355.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB355 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 7f6049e5011acf0e8581793f2bc2bb947aac2929fdb77abc318b2a6155c1ef71