Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 319ce3bcb8219c97…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

27.9 KB First seen: 2022-11-10
MD5: 93dd9e4d30e44657aa92d0f7180b0a2c SHA-1: 00022dd13b8b9108c790e84226261ca49ae9c03e SHA-256: 319ce3bcb8219c9759389e3676b5c4c6d279b16274a01b5bbe6eb7a788a55e86
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content, which is a common tactic for macro-based malware or exploit delivery. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics strongly suggests exploitation of this component.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005a01.bin
305ad1dba6d7fb7c470f6a12c7c047def9561e429f89ca6469eff5fdc0b65967
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5A01 1551 bytes