Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3184240e68ae0480…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.0 KB Created: 2021-03-17 21:46:47 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-08-20
MD5: 9739a018e1f76817e3f8f3c48e7b35e0 SHA-1: c4857d36ba730e6f9c08afb37d2198b405838054 SHA-256: 3184240e68ae04808f32ada416dd249cba1f82ef3c938a0c28393dc509f0db26
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous external links, many pointing to disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to distribute malicious content or phish users. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were directly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs are indicative of a malicious document, likely a downloader or part of a phishing campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9991

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://midufefew.ru/award?keyword=literature+and+language+learning+in+the+efl+classroom+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4461497/normal_5fe2e6c903e36.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4409813/normal_6038c67ed89b6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pufojoloz/gGwgiOY/love_live_3d_wallpaper_hd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pejedakava.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453393/kozalomumagaxabix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373511/normal_60445c7b08ed7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4501656/normal_601bfe21ebd34.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4501634/normal_5ff7ba06880a4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vasegodesazu/gdojaAP/homestead_land_for_sale_in_tennessee.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lifezudo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739479/6e3b6e18589.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kupawusel/iejftjJ/xebamamuxobikeratufenox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vonewujin.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380349/pejumapu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/toridezoxiko/Tq0fwre/xoxoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://8fc1c2d6-49ba-4d63-8b95-0327ef2b1627.filesusr.com/ugd/1849a1_175624dbfd714f3c9fcf9b824e9e8d08.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://76bf42c0-7447-45ed-8dd3-33f9786ae3ae.filesusr.com/ugd/ba2c19_6f61acce04ef420997a204d9fa1bbfba.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6529c72d-6dca-4978-ac0e-be3431fa1739/who_is_a_flat_character_in_animal_farm.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cc968bdf-8a18-4a65-a72d-893c706ef441.filesusr.com/ugd/bae363_af40a9d6910a4742ad6d9c6e45739621.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0d4457dd-be29-4732-8011-80c2d10ef498/braun_series_9_wet_dry_electric_shaver_review.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/polojuliragam/charlotte_s_web_full_movie_free.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jimugivos/65773294394.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1f701a37-c103-4852-bfc9-7bf515a74e7b/where_does_evil_dead_2_take_place.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/58b18d2a-c792-4c14-a099-309f8c20d62b/fewodut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0b22eb62-f6a0-46f4-a8d3-8015119f7cd8/18619511659.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://64f3f273-fd79-4cea-bc15-92b2431614e2.filesusr.com/ugd/542254_578e358d3e69466798aea0215348c3b0.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001023d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1023D 5392 bytes
SHA-256: 87008cfdf540ebea36e927e001d97fd9680378a2adf2404dab45466365097ab6
font_01_sfnt_off00011463.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11463 11752 bytes
SHA-256: b7eacc8ae63f1f1bbcce38276dea14ec88f765fe1f27891f295b5ef0c6c3a1ff
font_02_sfnt_off00013bc8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13BC8 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 05d2457133b820fa77aa358e30e9acfbad3f04c46ced9a37296d9311117db176