Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 317f242355e9628f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

106.3 KB First seen: 2024-10-12
MD5: be18aaf8f0ebf4242b2556bd9bb30e8d SHA-1: f3a2647cdf8ad2a72b8417ce9cdcc3eac10d0a0d SHA-256: 317f242355e9628fef0be71934a0a39ef0b5514d3983345f5ffb387f5c9e1940
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that exploits a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The \objupdate directive forces the activation of this object, which is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of RTF-specific heuristics like RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE strongly indicates an exploit attempt.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000151a.bin
ee4f519dc48c11ded2dadc1045f22c7d5b5cd490520b25417ce0850bb6b3d29c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x151A 2176 bytes