Malware Insights
The sample leverages the CVE-2017-0199 vulnerability, indicated by the OLE2Link/URL Moniker heuristic, to fetch and execute a remote payload from the URL http://104.168.46.25/doc0/1/O0O0O0O0o0o0o0O0O0O0O0O0O0000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23000000000000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2300000000000.dOC. Although no executable VBA code was found, the presence of the CVE exploit and an embedded PDF with suspicious static findings suggests a downloader or exploit delivery mechanism. The embedded PDF's 'PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE' finding further supports a social engineering attempt.
Heuristics 5
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OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
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Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGEA valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
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VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
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PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LUREPDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://104.168.46.25/doc0/1/O0O0O0O0o0o0o0O0O0O0O0O0O0000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23000000000000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2300000000000.dOC
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673 |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1206 bytes |
polyglot_child_pdf_off00046000.pdf3bd3d2ef0aa5575b30d3f2dd93126a4f5983b1025fdced21b3ecfe6f81e02a3e |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x46000 | 585728 bytes |
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdfddcf228cf8707fa722e43e469a65c47fa11bbdd7dfd612042cb4f3d28ad001d5 |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 | 868352 bytes |
polyglot_child_pdf_off0006f400.pdf5f61841eca3de18b613cf518a8903a5181c4ea419a779369bfd6cb9ce1d94c0c |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6F400 | 416768 bytes |
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