Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 317398e617675f2f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

259.9 KB Created: 2021-11-08 12:39:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 74c8c3d42d8017898c0e07a0d28a73e8 SHA-1: da2d6ac29db78b5dbb1a96fd79c9926edcb3e19f SHA-256: 317398e617675f2fe503edb40ed10c8cbd2642d1d5c157108e9426067fe007f6
69 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking

The OOXML document contains an embedded OLE object, identified as a risky file type due to its executable/script nature. This object, named 'ooxml_oleobject_00.bin' and 'ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin', is the primary indicator of malicious intent. The presence of this embedded artifact suggests the document is designed to deliver a secondary payload, likely an executable or script, to the user.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
2c41838b466d6e934db77c38657ed82b10fc0c6389a29dba7ed7ccf1e07b58cf		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 257536 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.96, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
b104ca779790718bd2930a7905dcb9f8226fb1dcb9887253e747602d619c62c9		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 252582 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.98, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
8887125988eb262e330d6bc795a0fe0fb812d207af749aa6b5b0ccee2b46c197		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5140 bytes

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