Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3157771487b7226e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.54 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: d9b9ebaaea790797edee0da21df3e540 SHA-1: 61e505a2e6b721369dc4e24d02df454196ffe7de SHA-256: 3157771487b7226ec0ac85140708346279681a5a7ec2e97af02e7cb544a6a8c9
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically triggering heuristics for Equation Editor and CVE-2017-8759. This indicates the document is designed to exploit a vulnerability in the Equation Editor component of Microsoft Office to achieve code execution. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" sections further supports the exploitation of OLE object activation. No scripts were extracted, and the document body is obfuscated, but the core attack vector is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0017a932.bin
cb918fd6e6bb64e638ddfbadedd360d0b86e8678a390a257429640734a39bd6d		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x17A932 3732 bytes

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