RTF malware analysis — malicious · 31140a7886fc0eb5

MALICIOUS

RTF

83.1 KB First seen: 2024-07-23

MD5: 485c8b0bbaec4e72949307d766a4bfba SHA-1: 955c3d40f463ceb059f1443db2dacc39a6ff4fc0 SHA-256: 31140a7886fc0eb5ad8c8cfa9b6f1235107c3be462509629786219fc02475c6a

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object will be activated upon opening, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000111e.bin` `32af3fbf9da5d2464422874cc63a3e9f0d76e43a9c27209b75ea1ec6bbbd7ecb`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x111E	1746 bytes

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