MALICIOUS
340
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1055.012 Process Hollowing
The heuristics indicate the document leverages Windows API functions such as WinExec, ShellExecute, VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress. This strongly suggests the document is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely by injecting it into another process. The OLE slack anomaly further points to a packed or obfuscated payload within the document. Without a document body or scripts, the exact lure and delivery mechanism remain unclear, leading to a lower confidence in family attribution.
Heuristics 8
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Reference to WriteProcessMemory API critical SC_STR_WRITEPROCESSMEMORYReference to WriteProcessMemory API
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Reference to CreateRemoteThread API critical SC_STR_CREATEREMOTETHREADReference to CreateRemoteThread API
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Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXECReference to WinExec API
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Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXECReference to ShellExecute API
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Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARYReference to LoadLibrary API
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Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESSReference to GetProcAddress API
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OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALYOLE file is 140,704 bytes but its declared streams total only 21,151 bytes — 119,553 bytes (85%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
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Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOCReference to VirtualAlloc API
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