Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 30e80519bdad0701…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.1 KB Created: 2021-08-22 06:42:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 819568c3d24c2e7ecca11448cc2e3b97 SHA-1: f770fff459a5a774693ae5bb6b01ce110f3224cd SHA-256: 30e80519bdad07013363a9ca019ad4ae2f3fb0417c982a984177834f435e9fa6
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous links pointing to compromised WordPress sites, which host further PDF files. This suggests a link farm designed to distribute malicious content. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. No scripts were extracted, but the structure implies a downloader or redirector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://gingerwooddesign.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b76cfd68e2a---83145728885.pdf
    • https://israelonthehouse.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b853dfdec66---1570593115.pdf
    • http://ipvoicenj.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16073e48db20f7---fagupuzapamugirusekiz.pdf
    • http://resetimpianti.it/reset/public/file/bitubusomiwapozudup.pdf
    • https://www.quatainvestimentos.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160913e9e29f9d---dojujidabe.pdf
    • https://suhrsmad.dk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16076227b5c8a4---49206228903.pdf
    • https://www.accidentinjurylascruces.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fmkjtcnfkur0rgg2coqn37hskp/lefuwutokozuvod.pdf
    • http://www.acefence.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16077abaa3bbc2---41966701395.pdf
    • https://vrindaindia.com/php/joseph/uploads/file/gejuw.pdf
    • http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a2u15fue2h89mrtbrace6k3pg7/pupaputewanifukavukap.pdf
    • https://atraba-holding.com/userfiles/file/meboxedifokiv.pdf
    • https://www.pferde-fuer-unsere-kinder.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1611144899ca35---pisoganajofufu.pdf
    • http://xn--80ackbssfuieecff0e8c.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e0shj8i7nnbos1h6nvtep2vme3/vijaselomabipuz.pdf
    • http://gumberryoleschool.com/clients/33891/File/72052093842.pdf
    • http://abogarestudio.com/userfiles/file/demurama.pdf
    • https://lienlacanien.com/img_pages/file/bexinitep.pdf
    • https://cissud.it/uploads/ck_editor/files/78903712430.pdf
    • https://elitestrategyglobal.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e78e4ed4fd99af3890cebc69aa2a41b9/5941935016.pdf
    • https://xn-----6kcabagcgfjsxjciriy6alkh6a7aqk.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/55c049e4d16b079fabaa9a36f50e040c/sopopox.pdf
    • https://phoenixknights.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e118987cbdec25c78e647ce5201d99a3/pukaluwo.pdf
    • https://www.fecomerciomg.org.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606ccad50b774---29301772040.pdf
    • https://razvozka24.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2b9e2c7fecad4f73be6188b6591a635a/bofifupokamazotora.pdf
    • http://www.northeastmarquees.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2886be4ea11010622904314a0049862c/67594099097.pdf
    • http://soleilboo.com/images/uploads/files/46364401390.pdf
    • http://cukorbetegshop.hu/files/43695428277.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/A3Ryygt5BCM/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+program+clicker+universal+keyless+entry
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dc35.bin
889da8dccf94a53b61d3d8cecc1cba42a852a6fa674b502b43da3c889f977a31		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC35 16944 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001083c.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1083C 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012053.bin
d36069c204078570fe953bea3253f92dc5a73c0b6b3587d4bf298f52c5a6b339		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12053 11164 bytes

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