Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 30d5382638d8d5ae…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

277.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-01-20
MD5: bb29492b104c201770101373fdf67d97 SHA-1: 4297b5b422b73a5072c05d52e7bb679386fd42db SHA-256: 30d5382638d8d5ae1e9250007ac845fb0b4bdef31df2f0e9cdfc931cf99f491d
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The file is an Excel spreadsheet containing an embedded Equation Editor object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the object is processed. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the presence of the exploit payload is a strong indicator of malicious intent. The embedded ole10native_00.bin file is the payload delivered by the exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
f04b028e956f2d982f99e76a48f56e2894f03cd6c8f007fc92822770d3ee4f37
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0021A6F6/OLe10NATive 1620 bytes