Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 30afcb4d640f9e65…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

385.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: c90749a2cd8d7a8ad0cbfa64fb2d8691 SHA-1: 9b316d0f43d95866ba01d044c8addab2b0f7a75f SHA-256: 30afcb4d640f9e65da53f556cce02c5adf233e719404e0fded38f62595110069
128 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_0199 indicates the exploitation of a vulnerability in OLE2Link to load a remote resource. The embedded URL 'http://strms.ly/fqFc' is identified as the source for this payload. Additionally, a secondary embedded PDF document exhibits suspicious static findings, suggesting it may be part of the exploit chain or a secondary stage.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf
faf73b48e1915f886d866263f4349de7f4d2dfa4beb9c6138f8786edf470abb1		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00 391168 bytes

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