Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 30a472b6bcaed584…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.8 KB
MD5: 40878f1b7b3bc42c12c7d4329ac3e9f4 SHA-1: 82ba3045ba0950f7e10692ed00c168252c0a5c5b SHA-256: 30a472b6bcaed584f34af7822349d968e6b8f2f683c6fdcd55c5cf18205ab2ec
104 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and exploits the CVE-2010-2883 vulnerability in Adobe Reader's CoolType SING font parsing. The presence of JavaScript actions and streams, along with the critical exploit firing, indicates that the document is designed to execute malicious code upon opening. The embedded URLs, while not directly malicious in reputation, are likely part of the exploit chain or infrastructure. The XFA form structure also suggests a complex document designed for interaction, potentially to facilitate the exploit.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader CoolType SING font exploit — CVE-2010-2883 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_2883
    PDF embeds a TrueType/OpenType font with an actual SING table and pairs it with JavaScript heap-spray shellcode. This matches the public Adobe Reader CoolType SING exploit shape for CVE-2010-2883.
  • ASCIIHexDecode filter (with exploit indicators) medium PDF_FILTER_HEX
    Hex-encoding filter present alongside exploit delivery indicators — often used to hide payload or shellcode bytes
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/2.6/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.6/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0012_000.js
ef033130c4afb00363ab298788512f1561e9e04a7a099e7af37151587055fadb		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 12 at offset 0xA0BA 3796 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000033c.bin
683fcffe9abaad29001e134bdd9ad7d1628d5cbbf628c451b6c621f202a7dae4		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x33C 65932 bytes

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