Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 308fe893fbbac6b8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.9 KB Created: 2021-01-10 17:15:46 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: bb969015c7b59432fa9e70b52fb8c34e SHA-1: c448624e15696a5c5662d5c23e9f252421c6fd5a SHA-256: 308fe893fbbac6b83e2ee47577a4bc51fd6396d9ab2c233004ce5a01408f53aa
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file was identified as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, exhibiting characteristics of a link farm. It contains numerous external URIs, many pointing to disposable hosting and potentially leading to further malicious content or phishing attempts. The PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic specifically highlights the presence of a mass external PDF link farm, indicating a non-standard use of the PDF format for redirection.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffe.ru/123?utm_term=mike+mo+capaldi+girlfriend PDF link annotation
    • https://zadujemerumid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695269/8619744.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jadepibake/21sdMMN/kotobaferegorogekav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1178403.mozfiles.com/files/1178403/vimesijedem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zokasejiz/ea3iejc/55089593769.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1172834.mozfiles.com/files/1172834/train_taxi_app.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lurugidapu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134315770/58cf38c896.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://raxisova.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134494277/lakivo-tojopudividubem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wepuporo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132741302/nazipi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lesesaxaxutetu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134613106/piguselesofazet_gosexetuja_zetexi_wupodes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://babunugigexi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134582988/fusalolej-nedenez-sufesowididu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zururodi/Pyl5uib/a_vector_quantity_has_direction.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zatazewoz/66968388122.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bajapovogam/peremutivaxab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e265.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE265 5072 bytes
SHA-256: a5a453ad5a2f0baf8e8c3579aabe544f2ba32c7112576629b2ec701ca8e60663
font_01_sfnt_off0000f38a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF38A 10812 bytes
SHA-256: 7a6cd27626fae7a02756d37ed01be4a813841b943bcbaf12678d5b29185605ae
font_02_sfnt_off000118b6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x118B6 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1062cd8ddf90f4344fa193b395386d5669df1a952e5759311ca261a71931f361

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