Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 307e5a56ee088333…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

27.0 KB Created: 2022-05-30 06:30:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2022-08-17
MD5: aace0decf612527171caa746e42f3e23 SHA-1: 693877f7b5eef5e0b4f9b6b46fe9f07fee6b1b59 SHA-256: 307e5a56ee0883331ccfa8507634a820616216ca2517980c7e5e644b89e6114d
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample leverages external OLE objects and MSHTML-based vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2022-30190) to fetch and execute a remote HTML payload from a suspicious URL. This indicates a likely initial access vector for a multi-stage attack, aiming to compromise the user's system.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2022-30190 — Follina stage-1 external HTML oleObject critical CVE likely CVE_2022_30190
    External OLEObject relationship targets a remote .html with the Follina delivery shape (oleObject -> HTTP(S) HTML with trailing Moniker '!'). In live Follina samples the ms-msdt: trigger is served by the remote HTML, not the document itself.
  • MSHTML-style external object relationship critical CVE related OFFICE_MSHTML_EXTERNAL_OBJECT
    External relationship to https://polymorphous-exampl.000webhostapp.com/thatsahaayeeohnewithderRewchungswe — exploitable MSHTML/CAB/MHTML/HTA-style Office attack surface
  • OOXML OLE2Link remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 related high CVE related CVE_2017_0199_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship points to a remote URL. This is the OOXML OLE2Link activation shape associated with CVE-2017-0199 delivery, but the local file does not expose URL Moniker bytes or a weaponized extension/content type, so the exact CVE cannot be proven statically.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlst
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • https://polymorphous-examp.000webhostapp.com/thatsahaayeeohnewithderRewchungswesendanndieseiszukrass/yeettoohneschaamblyat/OhneJokeThatsyeetLogoutPage.html
    • https://polymorphous-exampl.000webhostapp.com/thatsahaayeeohnewithderRewchungswesendanndieseiszukrass/yeettoohneschaamblyat/OhneJokeThatsyeetLogoutPage.html
    • https://polymorphous-exampl.000webhostapp.com/thatsahaayeeohnewithderRewchungswe

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
ccb4b049a1d024eebf4e2eb26e9b15d0cfda126dd0e81e9d7deb3232368f26c4		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 229376 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
d3ee6b21153a11d5e9b64bba3cb1af4807bf4dce1819070fb8934918494fa1ff		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 167172 bytes
emf_00.emf
e85ed06697f863ed2bb1c71e71653f0dcd93c0b9c00a65a8f4853dd60bb961df		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 480 bytes
emf_01.emf
209c973636aa7b681e2d0efce1bd96bd1a968dd04d86f76b41888939bfa9e949		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 480 bytes

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