RTF malware analysis — malicious · 307b754ce6ff813f

MALICIOUS

RTF

85.5 KB First seen: 2024-08-15

MD5: 9853bd06615e0b92da339077f6aa9e85 SHA-1: b216dd55f8d4e037a5322abb20b6f344859a8164 SHA-256: 307b754ce6ff813f8f8b0ed95e3c76a2c8395c5e41580c435974a09f9bbee88e

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains OLE object data and is automatically linked, with specific heuristics indicating the use of the Equation Editor vulnerability. This suggests the file is designed to exploit a known vulnerability to gain execution and likely download further malicious content.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000156c.bin` `b20cc4b3b43628a568caae9cb4ceedc7881026eec40f2110e7141b02215cab94`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x156C	1689 bytes

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