Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 30774e6670ccbe66…

MALICIOUS

RTF

93.0 KB First seen: 2019-01-31
MD5: 0457f4a4fa7825404adc708849e98d31 SHA-1: fd68d9691dea113de0d9218913ce34099ee2b118 SHA-256: 30774e6670ccbe66b0ddc70543d179e13cc68955b1e909063ec229568223f8fb
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded OLE object, likely a malicious payload, is designed to be activated automatically. This points to an exploitation attempt for client execution, commonly delivered via spearphishing attachments.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000052ac.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x52AC 1915 bytes
SHA-256: efec923fdd0b134ec1773fa49690317454a735dc8da0296f4f6362309b7ee572