RTF malware analysis — malicious · 306c096e3dfe9250

MALICIOUS

RTF

375.3 KB

MD5: c244c9792b6022346a20e6cd0e5cbbea SHA-1: 03c922240f9dc163cfbcdcb3d6a7ce24c749a644 SHA-256: 306c096e3dfe9250ccfbcb9c07559273147579b51e6a39f647c347408cd28707

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple heuristics indicating the presence and activation of embedded OLE objects, including automatic linking and updates. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'download the document and click Enable Editing', which is a common lure for macro-based malware. No scripts were extracted, but the OLE object activation suggests an attempt to execute embedded code, likely for payload delivery.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000965.bin` `d422a481206bc3e2217d6d8a3ffb9099dcb5137e1c3c1738d93e9b3c7e4f158c`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x965	79776 bytes
`objdata_01_off00007114.bin` `d9444d023214a7c33a92133466857cdc05925bae54151eb6726c97f0db29d02d`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114	79749 bytes
`objdata_02_off0002f9ab.bin` `a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2F9AB	2632 bytes
`objdata_03_off00030f4e.bin` `e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x30F4E	12297 bytes

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