Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3065674596c85489…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.10 MB
MD5: 8c7e0004cbf4c2a9232ccdf005ac288a SHA-1: df8ae3bb1d03334735809c83b5e5145b1318dc2e SHA-256: 3065674596c854898338166dc11db3934203f5d354a50f1b87235503f7130b32
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of malicious activity, specifically related to the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 through an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics strongly suggests this vulnerability is being leveraged. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic indicates that the OLE object is forced to activate, leading to code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000011e1.bin
e78ba357a6c14b75e1d30dea6e322b62085a6a56b5f094ebe0675480a278fe68
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E1 35445 bytes
objdata_01_off00021c01.bin
a6f253d6bbd0460ac77e10ef1bc8f05800fa5562b3652b8ea10ed15d9e3c5eda
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x21C01 246442 bytes