Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 305c4fccbc4981b1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.0 KB Created: 2020-11-30 04:17:26 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-02
MD5: 667ab7b864f58de1282aa4ee347d491b SHA-1: 902de59894a9c2bb06d031c2dd2eec07fa59e48b SHA-256: 305c4fccbc4981b1e824d47533da1e948f465388a6e54fd7009ceb3caf27d72e
184 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document was flagged as malicious by an ML classifier. The file embeds a large number of external links characteristic of an SEO link farm and routes users through malicious redirector infrastructure. Specific URLs and indicators for this sample are listed in the indicators section.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffmen.ru/123?utm_term=discord+overlay+not+working+destiny+2 In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4428342/normal_5f9e9124ccd50.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lodirunesu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874391/8192911.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4460449/normal_5faeaad35da68.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365541/normal_5fa89879be4d9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4404524/normal_5f91d8e578ccd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fimupekegu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134502303/pakuxowu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://porelananov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775759/kozexafon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://birobidusizal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134638138/fidazuwiwopebo-vufuzaniximiset-gasugulo-demiwu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ziperivowupidu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381589/6966463.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kelunegitafisi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134625524/dufofuju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379722/normal_5fc23abbde373.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zosufolukariv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134755865/jugumukeposeroreleb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/daniwodug/saxon_math_course_1_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jazuravazaguz/gedifalejaxaves.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xeroguru/skin_cancer_image_dataset.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/suzeduselu/rovowinepuluzuzefarovixof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e326.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE326 3744 bytes
SHA-256: f5ffa2ede0d8c3bc9011f016b1b5d0b4ee4e74ed8d6135ab3b31c57f02283253
font_01_sfnt_off0000f072.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF072 5556 bytes
SHA-256: 27d7fcc3086ee57ca26b6f6283ab6c6235178ee1b135ae1787665313e8dbb75f
font_02_sfnt_off0001038d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1038D 11984 bytes
SHA-256: 61869111841d7be31a6424327f7b47d3f34c2d29f10db249333920bd87aabd2f

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