Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3051ae2525a386c5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.5 KB Created: 2021-09-30 14:53:59 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 22e7e0ff41f259d1a1afb1dcaa9160dc SHA-1: 40d6ffba2f6c94d5165dd6747804260e194fbded SHA-256: 3051ae2525a386c5c4aede2c33f8ff23667f76639ced79884994a4daf34e2c8c
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF is identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, exhibiting characteristics of a phishing lure. It contains numerous links to external sites, many hosted on compromised CMS platforms, suggesting an attempt to redirect users to malicious content or download further stages. The presence of a 'password-protected archive lure' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to obtain a password to decrypt a payload, a common tactic to evade gateway security.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9956

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 1 image(s), only 1 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 68 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://huntic.ru/uplcv?utm_term=tevar+full+movie+hd+1080p+download
    • http://cohn-vossen.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16155793bd58a2---tokitejegagelox.pdf
    • https://mannoorpally.com/uploads/file/11584489520.pdf
    • http://podhoru.cz/userfiles/file/57731041712.pdf
    • http://usarsenal.it/userfiles/files/tezofejonasujuna.pdf
    • https://lexcyberia.com/userfiles/files/topamexuwupewoduvase.pdf
    • http://www.airportlimofortlauderdale.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16151a19a1c90a---janapawa.pdf
    • http://www.impactit.in/ckfinder/userfiles/files/74587165797.pdf
    • http://www.studiolegalefusimorelli.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16136d873186b8---salenupetifelififiteda.pdf
    • https://www.mmgrowersg.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/fupodilopikuzepamakepixed.pdf
    • https://west-holding.com/userfiles/file/zajiredojuruzuj.pdf
    • https://10playsolutions.com/clients/softklk/documents/_articles_/file/zigifevu.pdf
    • http://www.iamgoingto1996.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614b5a884440b---botizilifosi.pdf
    • http://barrybusiness-crm.com/ressource/devis-photo/files/29635420202.pdf
    • http://prmakeup.com/Image/files/pozipamebipunewabaxo.pdf
    • http://symbioticlifetech.org/attfile/fckimg/file///2021091442833_1008089750.pdf
    • http://radioevangilereal.com/assets/ckfinder/core/connector/php/uploads/files/dobulumuguwegeju.pdf
    • http://maroba-zirndorf.de/file/josizoruvetuwadoxow.pdf
    • http://www.sarajevo-inn-grunewald.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614e21a7974ee---wojep.pdf
    • https://www.ayersworthglen.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614f8d56a68c5---tisurodukerarenanob.pdf
    • http://app0.linkeo.it/ckfinder/userfiles/files/wodepelolozoda.pdf
    • http://xn--90aoa5aj.xn--p1ai/ckfinder/userfiles/files/11336615226.pdf
    • http://meyergarden.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/bikitebiriwedeli.pdf
    • https://kuraniterbiye.com/resimler/files/56235694695.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000af2a.bin
06b2caaa0b8ad776081b42be993b36d75ecaba2e3cbf841b296861b4674d804b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAF2A 14316 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d2c1.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD2C1 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000ead8.bin
74be222d959690a0c8420186a57ff3c6f2e3be722d7ff921ca49c3eaffd9f248		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEAD8 11092 bytes

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