Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3044dcc58b709618…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.8 KB Created: 2020-08-08 22:50:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 60dd2bc1b852a2b4063dc3f5468e2730 SHA-1: fa2224e37b97a84f17a5ccfb5c111949743764a8 SHA-256: 3044dcc58b709618aaa427a3f99d6aa8357aca566e5e9363e35f7852c3c7dfb6
128 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a malicious redirector link and a large number of external links, suggesting a link farm or SEO poisoning attempt. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the malicious URL and other URLs that appear to be part of a link farm. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic further supports the lure-based attack pattern.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=convertir+pdf+a+png+candy
    • http://files.wayfarekey.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738622/9931682.pdf
    • http://files.mycarisdead.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856191/nusuzudew_vugul_raminivunekikoz_kamob.pdf
    • http://files.wandascadettesbatonstudio.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380728/43803.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6885/8272/files/3894139585.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7574/7483/files/buscopan_gts_bula.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0521/3854/files/61889302686.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8740/4968/files/kogubevumifidodig.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/6987/5111/files/14794852810.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/3179/6632/files/59638753211.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/9524/4441/files/wordpress_get_current_user.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/0379/5865/files/barron_s_sat_math_level_2_practice_test.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5530/0249/files/nitokaritidaloxar.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005768.bin
9e247bb3a09b37a043300a00816d8f4d2533d6b8ed901e9da2573b7050f2f619
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5768 5180 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006929.bin
955c3711849014a6d81818a8144c6ebeafc89d1a0e1ee134216c3dcab3edf209
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6929 13028 bytes