Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3024f6504d1efd93…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.7 KB Created: 2021-09-19 15:46:13 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 67e4959daa9baa52a0362ac11547501e SHA-1: 30c8f06c06a4f66ba743c36faac005ad5dbb706a SHA-256: 3024f6504d1efd930970c9294afc8e300174dbf8124177a1b107df69115bb91a
116 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a large number of embedded URLs, many of which point to compromised CMS uploads or disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed for redirection. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious. While no scripts were extracted, the structure and URL patterns suggest an attempt to lure users to external sites, likely for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9951

Heuristics 6

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://fitness-sport.it/userfiles/file/wevudabojako.pdf
    • http://lirealestatelitigator.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fd1ec866bba5333ab1f3a7bc88e84e71/33409867975.pdf
    • https://tutorsbureau.net/userfiles/file/49901527.pdf
    • https://gangnampools.com/contents/files/56931205655.pdf
    • https://sitarasign.ir/data/file/xafiworufe.pdf
    • http://gamax-motor.cz/data/dokumenty/kurix.pdf
    • http://christ-china.com/filespath/files/20210906135122.pdf
    • https://fieldofgreen.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dd3f2de6d21f310aeea859d94d724216/sixowoxotog.pdf
    • http://www.saaegfpolis.org.br/ckfinder/userfiles/files/24771377613.pdf
    • http://peaceinsrilanka.lk/userfiles/file/76827722941.pdf
    • http://ranch.pl/files/file/3066214719.pdf
    • https://loonbedrijfschimmel.nl/userfiles/files/41200310779.pdf
    • https://spazmedia.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16139ec46888f5---danalamuzunitorurumeze.pdf
    • https://www.cdscabling.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16145c5ddea3a5---96055724845.pdf
    • https://angelsstaff.com/uploads/file/72947827943.pdf
    • https://yantrasearch.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/73966757397.pdf
    • http://parkingparts.com/Upfiles/file/nelise.pdf
    • https://lyna-garage.com/htdocs/cljr/data/files/18760112562.pdf
    • http://yevres.fr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zenapofami.pdf
    • http://hzbmsj.com/images/upload/File/nutogu.pdf
    • https://www.spoton.pet/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/56dflgv8enm87vrv0lkmcttt61/52595085151.pdf
    • http://ud2-140.com/files/10376215556.pdf
    • https://dewalt-naradi.cz/media/upload/editor/file/10258491733.pdf
    • http://lica-mpt.it/userfiles/files/nogigofivojobupewag.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/zMnd8XtcwSM/uplcv?utm_term=gtr+50th+anniversary
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e6ca.bin
fd277c7ada0d60945a3bcb99d891d5ee1cc04f960141954a33ba2f637656a5d7
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE6CA 10512 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fecf.bin
01ca47f146564dc145af7a80eb25a91d31123c822553a54f2a2062d4d1d4751b
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFECF 17792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012db2.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12DB2 16792 bytes