Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 300f499649e02453…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

38.8 KB First seen: 2023-05-26
MD5: a8810c7322837ca344a410f1b0502ac1 SHA-1: 08117dee55b4f62af21d5b71595cabdc99353af2 SHA-256: 300f499649e02453118df01079d107dfca31dadc7e1bd12bdb3ba4c2f5353f6a
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object and specifically triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, indicating an attempt to exploit a vulnerability within the Equation Editor component. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass security measures and trigger the exploit. The presence of these elements strongly suggests the file is a dropper designed to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability for initial execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000057dd.bin
03250ebe83d678291ef454689f601c9be37154052e9747588cea3802e8f4d06f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x57DD 1570 bytes