Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 300500a190d25155…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

31.3 KB First seen: 2023-04-24
MD5: eecb5ed628aa49f55850fce6c0d54f02 SHA-1: a855c7bab5a62c5f0b7618ce95e2044c00bde39e SHA-256: 300500a190d25155cc8c4d880b4017c2ad4d339944091b5eee37be754a3e9251
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. The document body contains a lure to 'Enable editing', indicating the user is expected to interact with the document to trigger the exploit. The exploit likely leads to the execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002ee3.bin
fe69350f9cfdfd3273676b46240c220ce09c389d52da4a8682b758067649d7fb
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2EE3 1546 bytes