Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2ffacec3dba32f7b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

13.3 KB First seen: 2022-10-04
MD5: a5282a663f9a9a4ec0f7a7233c48feb7 SHA-1: 93312b3758323310d7515845e669595b5572293e SHA-256: 2ffacec3dba32f7b9a094fed4efc336e23fdc194fb02d6b039c74043815f38b5
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document that leverages an Equation Editor vulnerability, indicated by the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic confirms that the document contains instructions to enable editing and macros, a common social engineering tactic to bypass security measures. The embedded OLE object data further supports the exploitation attempt.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001092.bin
c2e1580d8d463df0927d9a098d4242862477db69aaae4f78f17fe6995f4bfcb9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1092 1683 bytes