Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2fddd2b07584a46e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.6 KB Created: 2021-06-20 11:30:30 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-04
MD5: 1cb8c425fab0c757c2e654f4cd6ffee4 SHA-1: 745fd63ffe9b497f4190d22d3faf12b70ccb8c7b SHA-256: 2fddd2b07584a46e59d8a3d3430a0f0fe83be7776b13289324d019498fa4efe5
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains an embedded JavaScript payload that, combined with the document body text referencing 'Powershell tail log file', suggests an attempt to trick the user into executing malicious code. The presence of multiple links to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting further indicates a malicious intent to distribute further payloads. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support the malicious verdict.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.lightingandhvacexpo.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6f0ba54c6b340323692a1d9554190b89/jikuzifipimelari.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://www.lorenzofranzone.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dd91c69a2d0763817f1e2ce3e11e262d/gabipolal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aucordechasse.fr/vosImages/62534612116.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alcc.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2vg4d9mugnhjia8nnehcqarps2/42256392588.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dursunguney.com/userfiles/files/zosomemelitemedije.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pck.malopolska.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5a7f14880465a79bef3384e2ce8869ec/xibulugewiwepovipatoke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vilaportugal.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607c886a7f247---15847022516.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://christembassyromford.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c57fc0e3c98ec4dc3960456d7e85316d/95546060495.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://skup-laptopow.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16097c0605d88e---90111923172.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vakukh.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/670acc34d40dcd7f33cdff2e7a104765/podubikixe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zwickerfoto.hu/_user/file/91740334247.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pet-fashion.ro/mm/file/34198705612.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mariellatriolo.it/public/file/23780666678.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.lightingandhvacexpo.com/In macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/YTWXjIUwRh0/uplcv?utm_term=powershell+tail+log+filePDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0001290c.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x1290C 1573 bytes
SHA-256: 021cfb0b97e6fcc2a1069da4836d55bd3c762dc3ca5f796888e16c76d3ee5100
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='PDF Studio'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Noxalali Noxoze</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell tail log file.    To aid setup and debug scenarios for applications that output data to files, you can live monitor</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Powershell tail log file.    To aid setup and debug scenarios for applications that output data to files, you can live monitor</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell tail log file</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='PDF Studio'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-01-19T22:05:11'
  xmp:CreatorTool='PDF Studio'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='fbdebe35-596f-4b36-b7b8-56e214b63d95'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='b316352b-c76f-49fb-b712-71485f48cf2b'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000e72b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE72B 5124 bytes
SHA-256: 5e1258db88c6f245b7927c51d01e597fe9bb06a9fefd239cfa6b76559cfcfb5d
font_01_sfnt_off0000f8a9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF8A9 12208 bytes
SHA-256: 194b4da3258784a33c5786fe9bcf72d7967c91df159daa07a45e2be6a68c1af8

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