IcedID — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2fdbebd325ab18f4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

34.1 KB Created: 2021-11-01 04:33:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: ddc021b2cab1906aac26441105fc5a29 SHA-1: 5dcfba7b42716c0e338fc39af5c2b7d6cc7f42e6 SHA-256: 2fdbebd325ab18f4d92c757cb8377674237d7a0ad49502ce26d9b6df84db95f8
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

IcedID · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains VBA macros, including a Document_Open macro, which is a common technique for initial execution. The script within 'macros.bas' uses CreateObject to instantiate a 'wscript.shell' object and then executes 'explorer.exe' with a dynamically constructed command. This indicates the script's intent is to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection explicitly names this as 'Doc.Downloader.IcedID', strongly suggesting the IcedID family.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
ef6b27ac54d77ed03619c1f8602fe4ec8803e25a321d857dfbe361f33808ddc0
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1012 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
aa2e1d43ff8468560efe5c08e384c638d43d3dc89f7429408cad756d4a82e9ec
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 15360 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.