Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2fcbc1f021fb7e5e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

30.5 KB First seen: 2023-05-05
MD5: 2748c85909566facdb25450a5db5daa7 SHA-1: 26083397c80de658c19bc2cbfd7c80932beaaf24 SHA-256: 2fcbc1f021fb7e5eeae01012e094f0c99d4699f893fd07a511edae7f844f7803
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, and an \objupdate directive that forces OLE activation. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content. This combination strongly suggests an exploit targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004e54.bin
7fe6d5927a8a9d31eaf15a51c4668214b86197fe4b09dc0faba8d56b0f2f9708
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4E54 1886 bytes