Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2fad0816c123a7e5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.0 KB Created: 2021-09-01 03:27:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 505b34f04486fd1ba25241f724a9d45d SHA-1: dbd23d12823c76d94c5592cd40f6a979ab2890cd SHA-256: 2fad0816c123a7e522041833caeca6465f10ac05de73eba4575753385a0a9ac1
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. It contains a large number of embedded URLs pointing to various domains, many of which appear to be compromised WordPress sites used for hosting malicious PDFs. The heuristic 'PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM' suggests these links are part of a link farm designed for SEO manipulation or to distribute further malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9985

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://laborke.ru/uplcv?utm_term=knots+to+kmh PDF link annotation
    • https://dtd.com.pk/ckfinder/userfiles/files/25083183103.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://metzpaintings.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084bc7904364---51263556346.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.191seo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c78353953aa---dubesepatedokig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.petersmetalstitching.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a9db9e399cf---vunigaminovenub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://king-tableware.com/uploads/files/202108290856271506.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://prcomponents.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/46779194447.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jollytime.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/93fb10bde185ca479330a1bef688c8ff/52347009213.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://atamergranit.com/userfiles/file/neteso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.christinemartin.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160824ee2a5f25---43455744339.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hoondb.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160977d9b74d3d---61850560192.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://popcouncilinstitute.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4da07f7ca11a14ebd400cbee5472acd8/30265798448.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.whirlpool-beachcomber.at/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a355cb6d405---13467375634.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://singaporeroadshow.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3056dd1adf5b3d6392d95f26d646ba66/59993960725.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://es-umzuege-transporte.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7279beb6aeb34833794c7f83c95a9872/33151396581.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.segurosfacility.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b2685a6d0f6---74806731695.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://westernstudioservice.com/admin/userfiles/file/68369571899.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://benchmarktransitions.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16076f9a50ebcf---bevikosivedadiribomif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://qca.ch/userfiles/file/40999887534.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nowbali.co.id/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16071a705cbf1a---muwimukivebemifopo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://drvision.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160f8bc8ecbfd1---54204783166.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://protech.com.ng/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a5e31b5ad49---33580801967.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://securityguardsupply.org/php/uploads/file/xozuwunuwolibo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://razaviota.ir/basefile/razaviotair/files/lalopixixulo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e2e9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE2E9 9924 bytes
SHA-256: 7ba3f5dffb1b7cae833aea7e371555b93ba9b82176f3533376a9426dd4533082
font_01_sfnt_off0000f89e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF89E 17736 bytes
SHA-256: 6bc81cf0cdd31ebf5c4acecf65447ade843be701f328153f61e85d5e7845f87e
font_02_sfnt_off000125f6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x125F6 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.