Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2fa932a37b1a1170…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.4 KB First seen: 2018-10-26
MD5: 4fab2233dba684539af63425872afc0a SHA-1: 694aa5fd06265de26f8f6294b7f149ead1c8223d SHA-256: 2fa932a37b1a1170d8a309fe58c527ee1ea09134722821a04b26d6428b8dbf5e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics for the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR) and OLE object activation ( RTF_OBJUPDATE). This indicates the file is designed to exploit a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor to achieve code execution, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of these specific heuristics strongly suggests this attack vector.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3C 1699 bytes
SHA-256: 12eb7ac089f3fc4a7cbde0bfaf99067c5fc09bdd447f4a418914fc256be5af7d