Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2f95dd16d1a39ffe…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

21.1 KB
MD5: 69a05eaec285cd06f5a85879bba7e746 SHA-1: 574c05f3732e701765b351c691c8a671c6184627 SHA-256: 2f95dd16d1a39ffe5ecae2d8a0728e7b35af676bcfbe84fbdaa84ed6087b78ad
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening. This suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to download and execute a secondary payload, likely leading to further system compromise.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001140.bin
0800262c1a6d328d6d963a431023b90075c5d664f19f73c9eb1dc4ad08fdf8d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1140 1830 bytes