Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2f7014c598a900f8…

MALICIOUS

RTF

87.9 KB First seen: 2024-07-23
MD5: 29b3fc11ab9d647ec19d3e02364355b2 SHA-1: bcacc163004990d917d6402942e3e34609fa33e5 SHA-256: 2f7014c598a900f828893aeb0c0724d9f48c37c6987dfc12847525df174e0e81
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566 Phishing

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) via embedded OLE object data. The heuristics indicate that the OLE object is automatically linked and its update is forced, suggesting it's designed to execute code upon opening. This points to a delivery mechanism for a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001cbb.bin
7c609c8bc4fa446e749be561f3b8af3a732b36d7bb3a000a8ad47faf017f964f		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1CBB 1803 bytes

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