Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2f4d862face38a0d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

14.0 KB
MD5: 3fe20eb72341d74b33772fd4a0509530 SHA-1: d80650084cac74db505aba0bda3f8967ecc1dd39 SHA-256: 2f4d862face38a0d469e3ba090edcb7932284bb1ce650b97e24470cde0fad68c
124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains multiple embedded JavaScript streams, with high-confidence heuristics indicating the use of eval() and unescape() for obfuscation. The deobfuscated JavaScript is extensive and appears to be responsible for downloading and executing a secondary payload. The presence of these obfuscation techniques and the nature of the script strongly suggest a malicious downloader. No specific family could be confidently identified.

Heuristics 6

  • eval() call high PDF_EVAL
    eval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution (matched inside decoded stream)
  • unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE
    unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN
    PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0007_000.js
93f3fdceb942579280d3f196f445d15453064a5ad968d92ae645d590c8b83fa8
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x195 166 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
6a00c32033d30df1b42e221eec265892ef231e607140dfffe5fca9eba873beb5
deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x298 18654 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
deobfuscated.js
06a222b6fe417fe5876429822ea15bd2d339c0a5730566758679d19e0b2e17fc
deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 66822 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).