Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2f3195583346908d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

100.4 KB Created: 2021-07-22 04:52:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 43947ed2bd10072120f41ed9cac590ad SHA-1: 84b277d7561c88e77af0ecc0a84e7c28f1a7816f SHA-256: 2f3195583346908dfa27858d4b877864488dfc2eabc40317f1c1aba3686c9a47
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is identified as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, with heuristics indicating it functions as a link farm on compromised WordPress sites. The embedded JavaScript stream suggests it may be used to facilitate the redirection or download of further malicious content. The presence of numerous unknown URLs hosted on various domains, many appearing to be WordPress uploads, reinforces the phishing and malware distribution intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9931

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://prosegik.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/361bd7f3672b0fdcdb9996fab4cd466a/3417577368.pdf
    • https://repare-ton-smartphone.com/userfiles/file/nopovevi.pdf
    • https://wamsconference.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/23e11237689159651cc4a31927c00db3/jelaxodolobuvij.pdf
    • http://self119.net/upload/userfiles/2021/07/files/210709093424.pdf
    • https://elektrona.cz/files/file/mofarudikerobod.pdf
    • http://grupogmec.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bc38d2c8076---87158512910.pdf
    • http://accurateverdicts.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ab6c4ceb7f7---35851092281.pdf
    • https://kayakbranson.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160968f254b558---44896657038.pdf
    • http://snotlicker.com/clients/10243/File/zekagofizotefugesipawad.pdf
    • https://shotclock.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/96787246297957cd6eb13c9434a65f8e/mezitodiwonunipa.pdf
    • https://tckontrola.hr/files/4500480937.pdf
    • https://suhrsmad.dk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d66c3a3d78e---52582642046.pdf
    • https://haps.company/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/85c78tf8sicubsc2a5h82rdfl3/girelamopafimodaxebesus.pdf
    • http://bvsaigonbinhduong.vn/uploads/files/novujarisodowojotemomun.pdf
    • http://elmiraclassiccountry.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ap5cs4btl67ltt2v65ikevndv2/baposufev.pdf
    • https://eyestech.in/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ru7cgfh1947a4116k8crkk15tq/fitidinuravuvefi.pdf
    • https://carparts-fixture.com/file/file/rotisaxazatexerasos.pdf
    • https://www.kadeavenue.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3f16cef2df3a2ee4bb6e968a2c97193b/98445978794.pdf
    • http://becro-plast.hr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608aace239025---47079261070.pdf
    • https://ceral.pl/ceral/pliki/file/fibetigazizipujako.pdf
    • http://euhoca.com/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/80990048444.pdf
    • https://grandhotelbulgaria.com/userfiles/file/nesumojogemabo.pdf
    • https://clickkedai.com/userfiles/file/repowijijef.pdf
    • https://www.lesson-online.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/hj5hnka9tl24ck8ddk2ohihji2/51242444284.pdf
    • https://www.ndgai.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5r0bg076rva8i16lhpiend5m87/36755698832.pdf
    • http://studiofantino.it/userfiles/files/15829885425.pdf
    • http://www.lifestaralberta.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a006637b33e---vikesatim.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/BvfzZFkJO3s/uplcv?utm_term=national+cathedral+services
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00011f72.bin
8ad62ba6fe901714b40aa4d4941ee4ca61aae0036ace968805b3f866bc9be7e8
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11F72 10512 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00013754.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13754 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00014f66.bin
c30a6a7c27e97c5c93c2924a3313123416ccc86ef9eda23de2d6e4362f6bbdc7
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14F66 20444 bytes