RTF malware analysis — malicious · 2f2b2c757a85e53b

MALICIOUS

RTF

14.8 KB

MD5: 90e60c68d3649013b79904c12d272e3b SHA-1: 689d35db527d99ad588a65eeae6c496c1f359fdd SHA-256: 2f2b2c757a85e53b5d155521f4a3e3cbe20d003408dead5c4bf922067e405280

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing an OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability. The heuristics indicate that \objupdate forces OLE activation, suggesting an attempt to execute embedded code. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware that downloads and executes further stages.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001ce7.bin` `e4722f596ee58a2717230ffc3657bf1b3dd39c1958a5f950d2261e76587ebec7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1CE7	2457 bytes

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