Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2f23c986e6699d6e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

120.3 KB Created: 2021-04-28 13:50:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000
MD5: 9eaf863bffdb3b9bb3bee0472bb8f63b SHA-1: 70fd62613060a5f1f32d7dc8736671104a021b6d SHA-256: 2f23c986e6699d6eacfd8c95789c2f8cfe7c33facd1359074636d03605de08ac
102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1071.001 Application Layer Compromise T1566.001 Phishing T1078.001 Valid Accounts

The file contains an embedded OLE object with a malformed Equation Editor CLSID and anomalous native stream data, strongly suggesting an attempt to exploit CVE-2018-0798. The presence of the Equation Editor component, coupled with the anomalous stream, indicates a potential memory corruption vulnerability. While the exact payload is not immediately apparent, the file's structure and the identified vulnerability strongly suggest a macro-based downloader or similar mechanism to deliver a malicious payload. The URL extraction further supports this, as it's likely used to download the payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Embedded OLE object word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Embedded Equation Editor OLE data contains anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style Equation Editor exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like, but it does not match the exact public matrix-overflow byte signature.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
bbe118849e6df6115f3bb7a2da8e9f3515d9b81ea9b6ff604537308d54332ff7		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 4096 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
940b63c27df4083bb4cff1f53ac03569a2b0bf193ba037275c467a2cb65e11c1		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: oLe10nAtIve 1669 bytes

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